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4. Introduction 
Cooperation in economics, as in most other human interaction, requires trust and 
trustworthiness to develop in the absence of complete and enforceable contracts 
(Cook and Cooper 2003; La Porta et al. 1997). Cooperation problems arise if there 
are short term incentives to exploit trust instead of cooperating (acting trustworthy). 
When interaction takes place more or less anonymously cooperation is especially 
built on mutual trust. In economics and game theory reputation formation is seen as a 
valid instrument for enhancing trust, trustworthiness and hence mutually beneficial 
cooperation (see, e.g., Milinski and Rockenbach 2006; Bohnet and Huck 2004; 
Resnick et al. 2006). Reputation formation is defined as collecting information about 
a player’s past behavior / action to form a reputation profile of this person. On this 
basis, punishment solutions become feasible even if interaction was anonymous 
despite the reputation1. If interaction between two parties was not continuous, 
personal reputation formation can be a complicated issue. Therefore, reputation is 
often provided through an institution who can establish a history line.  
Criminal records, credit registries as well as rating mechanisms in online trading 
facilities like eBay are prominent examples of existing reputation formation 
institutions. These institutions allow the parties that initiate cooperation (need to trust) 
to condition their decisions on this public information: their opponents past behavior. 
Employers get information about possible employees by consulting the criminal 
records.  Banks and other lending institutions base their interest rate decision and the 
decision whether to engage with a borrower upon the specific credit register or credit 
reports the potential borrower holds. Also buyers in online market places like eBay 
consider ratings of sellers to decide with whom to engage in trade and at which price. 
 
Information sharing in form of credit registries increases borrowers repayment rates 
(Brown and Zehnder 2007) and decreases informational rents banks extract in its 
absence (Jappelli and Pagano 2000). eBay’s peer to peer rating mechanism is 
another example of beneficial information sharing. Buyers voluntarily pay a price 
premium to sellers holding a good reputation (Resnick et al. 2006). In general there is 
evidence for significant correlation between achieved prices and reputation (Melnik 
                                            
1
 Punishment here is understood in the sense of indirect reciprocity as described by Milinski and 
Rockenbach (2006). 
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and Alm 2002). This incentivizes sellers to conform to the rules and provide the 
promised quality. Higher quality goods will be traded at higher prices which is 
beneficial for both sellers and buyers.  
Evolving from the research on benefits of information sharing, economists argue that 
apart from its positive effects, excessive forms of information gathering might be 
harmful to aggregated participants’ welfare. In credit markets excessively long credit 
histories or reports may decrease incentives to exert high effort (Vercammer 1995; 
Bos and Nakamura 2010). In particular, while restricting information can be beneficial 
depending mainly on the incentives and the borrowers’ quality (Elul and Gottardi 
2011), evidence on credit reports from the US suggests that removal of information 
leads to a decrease in efficiency (Musto 2004). Similarly, peer to peer reputation 
mechanisms, like the one used by eBay, potentially benefit from information 
restriction. For example the first bad rating a seller on eBay receives causes damage 
to their reputation in a way that the incentives to exert high effort afterwards are very 
low (Cabral and Hortacso 2004). Restricting information in such a case increases 
incentives and hence effort exerted. 
 
There is also analytical and systematic literature on the effects of the length of public 
history on outcomes induced by the reputation mechanisms. Focusing on 
improvements of existing reputation mechanisms (especially eBay like mechanisms) 
along the lines of restricting information, interesting suggestions are, among others, a 
form of exponential smoothening of reputation information as past behavior carries a 
relatively large weight in determining the current reputation (Fan, Tan and Whinston 
2005) or reputations mechanisms updating an agents profile every k periods instead 
of every period (Dellarocas 2006). In this thesis I want to follow these and 
systematically analyze effects of public information on cooperation and efficiency in a 
more general setting. I model the above described trust interactions with a sequential 
trust game. The game I use was designed by Dirk Engelmann and Jean-Robert 
Tyran as a part of the Ilee project to experimentally analyze the priors to trust and 
cooperation on the basis of socio economic data. The game is a sequential two 
player population game with random matching and reputation mechanism. The 
presumption, throughout the experiment, was that reputation formation is necessary 
to achieve cooperation and that different institutional settings on this reputation 
mechanism would lead to significantly different trust rates. Influenced by this idea on 
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reputation formation and the experimental and behavioral background, I analyze 
potential benefits and problems arising from publicly available information. 
 
Research Questions 
My primary objective in this thesis is to analyze the effects of reputation formation on 
cooperation and social wealth in the above mentioned sequential two-player trust 
game. I focus especially on two questions:  
First, is public information on delinquencies sufficient to ensure cooperation? I want 
to analyze if the introduction of public information on delinquencies makes 
cooperation in form of a stable Nash Equilibrium feasible. In particular, I want to see if 
the Nash-Equilibrium prediction changed with respect to the public information 
available under standard theory assumptions.  
Second, are aggregated players’ payoffs affected by excessive public information if 
not all players are completely rational and self-interested, i.e. should public 
information be limited? Supposing that there is a positive effect of public information 
on cooperation, I want to show that if delinquencies occurred, i.e. in a bounded 
rationality case, there is harm from excessive information.  
 
The Game  
The underlying trust game is a finitely repeated two-player population game. The 
stage game is played sequentially and I refer to the ones playing first as first movers 
(FM) and the ones playing second as second movers (SM). The game consists of 
five rounds, i.e. the stage game is finitely repeated. At the beginning of each round 
players are matched randomly. The first movers open each round and decide 
whether to play Out or Trust. If a first mover chose Out, the round ends. If she chose 
Trust, the matched second mover decides whether to play Betray or Honor and the 
round ends. If there was no random matching the cooperation problem could be 
solved by personal reputation building and a trigger strategy by the first mover in the 
infinitely (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991) but also the finitely repeated game (Andreoni 
and Miller 1993; Kreps et al. 1982). 
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Illustration 1: The stage game with second mover reputation 
 
Payoff structure: 
                                                               
                                                              
                                                                       
 
Repeating this stage game with random matching for any number of times leads to 
an accumulation of one shot interactions and the non-cooperative Nash Equilibrium 
prediction (like in the stage game). Therefore the game is extended with two 
cooperation enhancing mechanisms:   
First, with a binary coded reputation mechanism which provides public information on 
second movers past behavior despite complete random matching. This enables first 
movers to condition their strategy on the specific reputation of their opponents. The 
mechanism distinguishes between the good reputation (no delinquencies committed 
in the past), signalized by being Blue and the bad reputation (delinquencies 
committed in the past), signalized by being Yellow. A second mover holds a bad 
reputation if and only if they played Betray at least once in the last consecutive k 
rounds. The k, I will from now on refer to as history length limiting public information, 
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i.e. how far into the history of a second mover the mechanism allows to see. The 
reputation information is assumed to be correct as it is provided institutionally. 
Following the argumentation of Bolton and Ockenfels (2008), who refer to a “perfect 
reputation system”, the correctness assumption enables me to eliminate distortions 
arising from institutional failures.  
Second, with a credible first mover commitment condition which limits the end-game 
effect. First movers have to commit to a single stage game strategy which they have 
to play unconditionally on the round they are in. The obligation to commit to one 
single strategy is crucial for the existence of a cooperative Nash-Equilibrium as it 
helps to overcome the backwards induction. 
 
I specifically chose a trust game to conduct this analysis because the game 
represents a situation in which cooperation between first and second movers is not 
achievable without further enhancement. Furthermore, considering this game as a 
starting point, my results can be applied to several economic real world interactions 
such as commercial and retail banking, trade in the absence of enforceable contracts 
and labor markets. 
 
Bounded Rationality 
A fundamental assumption in standard economics is that all players are fully rational 
and self-interested and that this is common knowledge. I use an approach influenced 
by behavioral economics which goes beyond standard economic assumptions. I relax 
the assumption on rationality and selfishness by considering a share of second 
movers to be boundedly rational to model a more plausible and therefore imperfect 
world. Selten (1998) among others concluded that perfectly rational behavior is 
unlikely. Bounded rationality is introduced as trembles that occur with a certain, 
exogenous probability, along the lines of Selten (1975) and Stahl (1990). I define 
these trembles as mistakes (delinquencies) committed by second movers (second 
movers play both actions with an exogenous and positive probability without a clear 
underlying strategy and independent from the round they are in).  
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I do not oppose arguments brought in for other behavioral measures2 influencing the 
outcome of the game by assuming only bounded rationality. In the context of this 
thesis, however, I purposely focus only on boundedly rational players as I am not 
trying to explain the priors to trust and cooperation. Focusing solely on boundedly 
rational players may lead to an underestimation of the ability for cooperation (Bolton 
and Ockenfels 2004). I, nevertheless, show that cooperation is still feasible and 
stable even if there is a share of boundedly rational second movers included.  
 
Outline and Results 
The first part of the thesis is dedicated to analyze if providing public information 
through a reputation mechanism, in the presence of the first mover commitment 
condition, is sufficient to sustain mutually beneficial cooperation as a Nash-
Equilibrium. The model I (see Model 1) set up is based on standard economic 
assumptions, i.e. players are completely rational and self-interested, and this is 
common knowledge. I use an approach that is an adjusted game tree analysis. In a 
game tree all possible combinations of actions are laid out and then compared. My 
approach uses the rules set out in the game to conduct an analysis comparing all 
feasible but different second movers’ combinations of Betray, Honor and Out, 
allocated over five rounds. Second movers, assuming that they know the first mover 
strategy and the history length, can compare their feasible combinations. Thus in 
particular need to payoff maximize over these possibilities. In a second step first 
movers, knowing the second movers’ best responses (payoff maximizing choice), 
payoff maximize over their four different strategies3. The combination of the best 
responses defines the Nash-Equilibriums played. In the underlying trust game, I 
determine two different Nash-Equilibriums which are played uniquely with respect to 
the history length. The cooperative Nash-Equilibrium in which first movers play a 
trigger strategy (conditioned on the reputation) incentivizing second movers to play 
Honor as long as the threat of a bad reputation persists, i.e. up to the last round of 
the game. The non-cooperative Nash-Equilibrium is similar to the one round outcome 
where first movers have no incentive to play anything else than Out and the second 
                                            
2
 Possible behavioral aspects influencing trust and cooperation are, among others, reciprocity (Berg, 
Dickhaut and McCabe 1995 ; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004) and fairness and other trusting 
“characteristics” of players (Gächter, Herrmann and Thöni 2004). 
3
 Each first mover commits to one of the four stage game strategies (Trust and Betray respective to 
the reputation). 
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movers never get the chance to play. The specific history length k at which 
equilibrium predictions switch is denoted by k*. 
 
             
    
  
  
                                                        
                                                      
                                        
  
 
Therefore I conclude that in this framework public information in combination with the 
first mover commitment condition is a valid instrument to sustain mutually beneficial 
cooperation. There is a direct effect of the history length on the Equilibrium played. I 
derive from this that the robustness of the cooperative Nash-Equilibrium increases 
with history length k as incentives increase. The subsequent intuition is: the longer 
negative reputation prolongs, the smaller is the incentive to play Betray and the 
“easier” the cooperative Nash-Equilibrium is reached. 
The payoffs achieved in the Equilibriums differ significantly. From a social 
perspective, sum over payoffs over all players, the non-cooperative outcome is the 
least best. The cooperative outcome is the best achievable outcome and pareto 
better than the non-cooperative one. My results from this part support the ideas of 
economists working on the effects of reputation in the credit market (Brown and 
Zehnder 2007; Jappelli and Pagano 2000) and on interactions in online marketplaces 
like eBay (Melnik and Alm 2002; Resnick et al. 2006). Public information, in fact, has 
the power to sustain cooperation. 
 
In the second part of the thesis I focus on the question whether limiting public 
information has positive effects on social payoffs. For the analysis I use the same 
model apart from one significant difference (see Model 2). I assume that a fraction of 
second movers is boundedly rational. This is modeled as probability for second 
movers to make mistakes (act not money maximizing) due to cognitive limitations. 
Delinquencies, in form of mistakes to cooperate, are essential for considerations that 
excessive punishment could be harmful. Without delinquencies punishment never 
occurs, stays a threat and therefore has no direct effect on payoffs other than 
incentivizing second movers. 
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The intuition for social payoffs to be affected negatively by excessive information is 
the following. If delinquencies were committed, not only the incentives, but the costs 
of punishment increase as punishment takes place. Hence, the aggregated players’ 
welfare is decreasing. The question is whether it decreases solely because of 
delinquency or also because of the severity of the punishment. I use an approach in 
which I compare any two history lengths, bigger than the Nash-Equilibrium sustaining 
k* (from the completely rational part) to show that the respectively shorter one is 
generating more overall wealth. In particular, I derive conditions for which increasing 
history length from k’>k* to k’’>k’ is costly and by doing so prove that the respectively 
smaller history length is socially preferable. Hence, k* is the respectively shortest 
possible history length sustaining cooperation and therefore is the socially optimal 
one.  
This result is only valid in the context of a stable equilibrium. I show that there exists 
a cooperative Nash-Equilibrium that survives bounded rationality. In particular I show 
that the Nash-Equilibrium derived in Model 1 is robust against some bounded 
rationality second movers. Under the conditions needed to sustain these 
equilibriums, social payoffs are still decreasing in history length, but on average first 
movers’ would be better off from an increase in history length. Second movers’ 
payoffs on the other hand decrease by more than the first movers’ payoffs increased 
and overall there is a net loss from a longer history length. Again the shortest 
possible history length sustaining cooperation is socially optimal, even if it is not 
pareto better. If this Nash-Equilibrium is not leading to stable cooperation, I show that 
Coordination-Equilibriums sustaining cooperation, could be stable, i.e. equilibriums 
where first movers agree to play different strategies (trigger and the always trust 
strategy). If the Coordination-Equilibrium was played, limiting public information 
increases social payoffs and leads to a pareto better outcome. Nevertheless, the 
assumption that the Coordination-Equilibriums are stable is critical.  One might argue 
its existence with experimental evidence for the willingness to punish even though it 
incurs substantial costs (Milinski and Rockenbach 2006).  
From a theoretical point of view limiting public information is beneficial for society in 
cases where incentives for cooperative behavior persist for both players. Considering 
the controversial findings described before (Musto 2004; Bos and Nakamura 2010), I 
would see the differences in their results and conclusions coming from different 
frameworks and institutions, as well as from differently implemented restrictions on 
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information (removal of bad remarks after differing number of years). Also, the payoff 
structure used in my model might be different to the one present in the real world. In 
particular,              could be ranked in the opposite way which changes the 
conditions that need to be fulfilled for social payoffs to decrease with history length. 
Specifically, these conditions are not fulfilled for all populations and do not lead to the 
before described result of a falling payoff function. Underlying populations in the 
empirical studies could be different, where one fulfills the specific conditions and the 
other one does not. This could explain different effects of such a regulation on 
different populations.  
Nevertheless, regarding my results I would advise a limitation / restriction of public 
information. This restriction on public information should be implemented by a 
regulatory entity as it is unclear whether self implementation would result in a social 
optimum. The optimal history length needs extensive assessment and might differ 
from population to population. 
 
My main contribution to the literature is that I show the cooperation enhancing 
features of reputation formation and the positive effects of restrictions on reputation 
formation in one and the same trust game, assuming bounded rationality. Thereby, I 
give a benchmark for further experiments testing the ability to reach the socially 
optimal cooperation outcomes.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
The concluding implication is intuitive as most people act upon the principle 
described for finding the aggregated welfare maximizing solution anyway. People 
make mistakes and we know from personal relationships with friends, family and 
most notably with children that forgiveness is essential to sustain these relationships. 
Translated into economic interaction, in the form of this trust game, this means 
restricting information is essential as rationality sometimes prevents us from 
forgiving. But there should be a clear incentive for cooperation through the threat of 
potential punishment. This punishment should incentivize people to be good but 
should not punish them excessively. So, information restriction can have positive 
effects on aggregated players’ welfare. 
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5. Equilibrium prediction under full rationality 
In this part of the thesis I show that the game has a Nash-Equilibrium that supports 
cooperation. If there were no rational cooperation Nash-Equilibriums, the model I use 
to show the effects of limiting public information loses its predictive power. In 
particular, I suppose that there exists a Nash-Equilibrium in which first movers play 
the trigger strategy inducing second movers to cooperate. The idea is that first 
movers incentivize second movers to play Honor by playing a trigger strategy 
(punishing bad and rewarding good reputation). Punishment is understood as an 
incentivizing mechanism as rational and self-interested players incorporate potential 
losses due to punishment into their maximization problem. If avoiding punishment 
was less costly than being punished, there is, in fact, no punishment as second 
movers play accordingly. This punishment threat needs to be credible for this to be a 
Nash-Equilibrium, i.e. first movers need to have an incentive to punish if a second 
mover had a bad reputation.  
 
5.1. Model 1 
In a Nash-Equilibrium first and second movers play best response on the other 
players’ best response respectively and therefore have no incentive to deviate from 
these strategies. Thusly, the equilibrium is stable. In the sequential trust game 
discussed here first movers play first and hence, have the power to lead the game 
towards their favored outcome. In my approach to find the Nash-Equilibrium I use this 
characteristic of the game. I consider all possible first mover strategies which are 
limited to the four stage game strategies due to the first mover commitment condition. 
In fact, if all first movers were completely rational and self-interested all strategies in 
which first movers do not play Out facing a Blue second mover lead to the same 
result as second movers start Blue (recall the reputation mechanism: yellow only if 
played Betray at least once in the last rounds). I use a combinatorial approach to find 
second movers’ best responses with respect to history length k and the three 
different first mover strategies. Second movers face the problem of finding the payoff 
maximizing way to allocate playing Betray and Honor over the five rounds given first 
movers’ strategy and the history length. Then, I use the second movers’ best 
response to find the payoff maximizing strategy for first movers with respect to history 
length. Throughout the entire thesis I consider an average pair of players and not 
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specific players, to determine the dynamics of the game, to avoid that the 
calculations become unnecessarily complicated. 
 
Assumptions in Model 1: 
I. Both player types, first and second movers, are rational and self-interested. 
II. Players are maximizing expected payoffs. 
III. All assumptions on rationality are common knowledge. 
IV. The underlying game is a population game with role asymmetry, i.e. a 
share of the entire population is considered to be first and the rest is 
considered to be second movers. Furthermore the population is big enough 
for interaction between randomly matched players to be anonymous (and 
facing the same opponent twice is unlikely).  
Notation: 
k…history length, where               
Blue…indicating a good reputation 
Yellow… indicating a bad reputation 
 
Payoffs: 
– single payoffs also indicated as     
  respectively 
 a…FM (Out/…) b…FM (Trust/Betray) c…FM (Trust/Honor) 
 d…SM (Out/…) e…SM (Trust/Betray) f…SM (Trust/Honor) 
where: 
                                                               
                                                               
                                                                        
 
Strategies: 
S1 (…)
 ,S2(…)…first and second mover strategy respectively 
BR1(k,S2,     
 ) and BR2(k,S1,     
 ) …best response of the first and second mover 
respectively 
Three different second mover (SM) actions: 
B…play Betray if trusted 
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H…play Honor if trusted 
Out…one cannot actually choose to play Out as it is not an action but as 
mentioned here the second mover could “choose” to play Out by playing 
Betray in (one of) the round(s) before 
Four different first mover (FM) strategies: 
S1(Trust if second mover (SM) is Blue and Out if SM is Yellow) = S1(1,0)  
S1(Out if second mover (SM) is Blue and Out if SM is Yellow) = S1(0,0) 
S1(Trust if second mover (SM) is Blue and Trust if SM is Yellow) = S1(1,1) 
S1(Out if second mover (SM) is Blue and Trust if SM is Yellow) = S1(0,1) 
 
5.1.1. Second Movers’ best response 
a) Suppose all first movers play S1(Trust if SM is Blue and Out if SM is Yellow) = 
S1(1,0) and this is common knowledge. 
For k=1 there are 6 second mover strategies which differ in their outcome. The 
second movers have to decide whether and how often they want to play Betray or 
Honor given the round they are in and the fact that playing Betray is followed by a 
bad reputation and exclusion for the next rounds as FMs will play Out.  
In particular, SMs can decide whether to play Betray never, once, twice or three 
times and Honor respectively: 
 
Second movers’ payoffs from playing a specific strategy (where e, d, and f are 
second movers’ payoffs from a specific action)  
S2(B,Out,B,Out,B) = 3e +2d  
S2(B,Out,B,Out,H) = 2e + 2d + f  
S2(B,Out,H,H,B) = 2e + d + 2f 
S2(B,Out,H,H,H) = e + d + 3f 
S2(H,H,H,H,B) = e + 4f 
S2(H,H,H,H,H) = 5f 
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Combining these and the payoff structure the best responses are: 
                  
    
                           
                       
  
 
For k=2 SMs can play Betray at most twice throughout the five rounds. 
 
Second movers’ payoffs from playing a specific strategy (where e, d, and f are 
second movers’ payoffs from a specific action) 
S2(B,Out,Out,B,Out) = 2e +3d   
S2(B,Out,Out,H,B) = 2e + 2d + f  
S2(B,Out,Out,H,H) = e + 2d + 2f 
S2(H,H,H,B,Out) = e +d + 3f 
S2(H,H,H,H,B) = e + 4f 
S2(H,H,H,H,H) = 5f 
Combining these and the payoff structure the best responses are: 
                  
    
                            
                        
  
 
For k=3 there are again different strategies to consider where SMs can play Betray at 
most twice throughout the five rounds. 
 
Second movers’ payoffs from playing a specific strategy (where e, d, and f are 
second movers’ payoffs from a specific action) 
S2(B,Out,Out,Out,B) = 2e +3d   
S2(B,Out,Out,Out,H) = e + 3d + f  
S2(H,H,B,Out,Out) = e + 2d + 2f 
S2(H,H,H,B,Out) = e +d + 3f 
S2(H,H,H,H,B) = e + 4f 
S2(H,H,H,H,H) = 5f 
Combining these and the payoff structure the best responses are: 
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For k=4 there are again different strategies to consider when SMs can play Betray at 
most once throughout the five rounds. The k=5 case is equivalent because after 
playing Betray once a second mover is never trusted again. 
 
 
Second movers’ payoffs from playing a specific strategy (where e, d, and f are 
second movers’ payoffs from a specific action) 
S2(B,Out,Out,Out,Out) = e +4d   
S2(H,B,Out,Out,Out) = e + 3d + f  
S2(H,H,B,Out,Out) = e + 2d + 2f 
S2(H,H,H,B,Out) = e +d + 3f 
S2(H,H,H,H,B) = e + 4f 
S2(H,H,H,H,H) = 5f 
Combining these and the payoff structure the best responses are: 
                  
                   
Best response on S1(1,0) 
Considering the results from above, I distinguish two different strategies that are 
relevant for second movers supposing that S1(1,0) is played. First, the always Honor 
strategy in which a second mover plays Honor  in each round but plays Betray in the 
last round as it does not affect their reputation anymore (no punishment threat in the 
last round). Second, the Betray’Invest strategy in which a second mover plays Betray 
whenever they are trusted but always invest in a good reputation for the last round, 
i.e. plays Honor in a way that they have a good reputation in the last round as playing 
Betray in the last round is least costly. 
                
    
                                     
                             
                
   
 
Using the payoffs from the experiment, this translates in the following best response 
function: 
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b) Suppose all first movers play S1(Out if SM is Blue and Out if SM is Yellow) = 
S1(0,0) / S1(Out if SM is Blue and Trust if SM is Yellow) = S1(0,1) and this is 
common knowledge. 
For all          the SMs never get the chance to play as FMs play Out every period 
of the game because SMs start Blue. 
 
Best response on S1(0,0) and S1(0,1) 
 
                           
                      
c) Suppose all first movers play S1(Trust if SM is Blue and Trust if SM is Yellow) = 
S1(1,1) and this is common knowledge. 
For all          the SMs will play the single round payoff maximizing action, i.e. SMs 
play Betray as FMs play Trust in every period of the game and do not condition their 
strategy on the reputation information. 
 
Best response on S1(1,1) 
                 
                      
 
d) Best response on S1 and k 
Second movers best response function with respect to first mover strategy, history 
length and payoffs: 
            
    
                                     
                        
                           
  
Using the payoffs from the experiment, this translates in the following best response 
function: 
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5.1.2. First movers’ best response 
To find the first movers best response for the five round game I insert the second 
movers’ best response into the first movers’ payoff function. 
 
                   
    
       
                               
    
       
                   
    
    
                         
            
                        
   
 
Best response on BR2 and k: 
First movers best response function with respect to second mover best response, 
history length and payoffs: 
            
    
    
                                    
                       
                           
  
Using the payoffs from the experiment, this translates in the following best response 
function: 
             
              
              
  
 
5.1.3. The Nash-Equilibrium 
Combining the two best responses gives the Nash-Equilibrium prediction with respect 
to single round payoffs and history length: 
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Using the payoffs from the experiment, this translates in the following Nash-
Equilibrium: 
              
                                   
                                   
  
 
5.1.4. Cutoff level for history length k 
The non-cooperative Nash-Equilibrium is played if the history length is not sufficiently 
long with respect to the payoffs. The cooperative Nash-Equilibrium is played only if 
the history length is longer than the cutoff value k*. The cutoff level can be 
understood as the history length for which punishment becomes more costly than 
avoiding the punishment. It represents therefore the smallest history length which is 
cooperation sustaining, depending on the payoff structure. 
 
The k*-function:       
          4             
    
    
 
 
For the payoffs from the experiment by Tyran and Engelmann the cut-off value is 
k*=3.  
 
Looking at the k* - function it becomes clear that the specific Nash-Equilibrium 
realization and the history length k are strongly interdependent. A longer history 
length increases the cooperative Nash-Equilibrium’s robustness with respect to 
payoff structure. If the difference in single payoffs for second and first movers was 
small, the k* increases and vice versa.  
 
5.2. Results 
Given a certain history length there exists a unique Nash-Equilibrium for the five 
round game. In particular, there are two different Equilibriums to consider.  First, the 
cooperative Nash-Equilibrium where FMs play “Trust if SM is Blue and Out if SM is 
Yellow” (the trigger strategy) and SMs play the Honor strategy. Second, the non-
                                            
4
 The         condition is necessary to induce first movers to play the trigger strategy, as in this 
case being betrayed once (in the last round) and honored the rest of the time is better than the save 
Out-Option. 
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cooperative Nash-Equilibrium where FMs play “Out if SM is Blue and Out if SM is 
Yellow” and SMs play the Betray strategy. Which of these is played depends on the 
history length and the payoff structure. The two Nash-Equilibriums differ significantly 
in the payoffs achieved. The cooperative Nash-Equilibrium is pareto better than the 
non-cooperative one. This manifests the importance to choose a history length   
   . Cooperation is in general feasible if 4c+b ≥ 5a. The cooperative Nash-Equilibrium 
leaves first movers with 4c+b and second movers with 4f+e which are by assumption 
larger than the corresponding non-cooperative Equilibrium outcomes of 5a (for first 
movers) and 5d (for second movers) as can be seen from the payoff structure. 
→ The cooperative Nash-Equilibriums give both players a higher payoff than the non-
cooperative Nash Equilibriums.  
 
Using the payoffs from the experiment, this translates in the following Nash-
Equilibrium:  
Cooperative Eq.:  FMs get 340 and SMs get 250 
Non-cooperative Eq.: FMs get 250 and SMs get 100 
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6. Effects of limiting public information on delinquencies 
In this part of the thesis I provide a proof for the existence of a socially optimal level 
of publicly available information on delinquencies, i.e. a socially optimal history length 
for this game.  
Following standard theory, i.e. assuming completely rational and self-interested 
players, the specific history length is only decisive for the realization of the Nash-
Equilibriums. I defined the cut-off value, k* as the smallest history length that enables 
punishment. If the history length is smaller than k*, the non-cooperative Nash-
Equilibrium is played. Therefore, limiting public information in the sense of reducing 
history length from any level k’>k* to another level k’’>k’ has no effect on the game’s 
outcome. In the rational and self-interested player case a change in history length 
influences the outcome if and only if it crosses the level k*. 
 
 
Illustration 2: Rational prediction for the social payoff function 
If the two Nash-Equilibriums described in the previous part were ranked by social 
payoffs, the cooperation outcome is pareto better than the non-cooperation outcome. 
Therefore, without knowing what k* is, the longest possible history length is always at 
least as good as every other k. Unlimited public information, i.e. remembering 
delinquencies for the complete lifespan of a second mover, is the most obvious in 
guaranteeing the cooperative Nash-Equilibrium.  
 
This picture changes dramatically if considering a world with relaxed assumptions on 
rationality. Including a chance of delinquency, i.e. allowing for mistakes, the game ’s 
outcome will change with every change in history length. This is the case because, 
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other than in the rational case, the punishment threat transforms into a real 
punishment as delinquencies occur.  
My hypothesis is that punishment in the game comes at costs for both players. First 
movers, who carry out the punishment by playing Out when faced with a second 
mover who previously committed a delinquency, are giving up potential payoffs. 
Second movers who committed delinquencies get punished by receiving the smallest 
possible payoff through withholding. In this sense, enabling a fresh start through the 
limitation of information on delinquencies bears potential benefits on social payoffs.  
 
 
Illustration 3: Boundedly rational prediction for the social payoff function 
Following the intuition, the social payoff function is falling in history length, if a fraction 
of second movers committed delinquencies (are boundedly rational). In the non-
cooperative area social payoffs are independent from the history length. At the level 
k* there is a single jump in history length and cooperation becomes feasible. At k* the 
highest possible payoff is reached and from there it decreases in history length.  
Therefore, I claim that the shortest possible history length enabling punishment is 
payoff maximizing if not all players were completely rational and self-interested, i.e. 
eventually forgetting delinquencies can be optimal from a social point of view. 
 
6.1. Model 2  
Here I prove a falling social payoff function. I compare any two history lengths, bigger 
than k*, to show that the respectively shorter one is generating more overall wealth. I 
particularly derive conditions for which increasing history length is costly if k>k* and 
by doing so prove that the k* is the respectively best history length.  
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Assumptions in Model 2: 
I. First movers are completely rational and self-interested. 
II. There are two types of second movers. First, there is a fraction of rational 
and self-interested players. Second, there is the fraction of boundedly 
rational players. 
III. Bounded rationality is modeled as a probability to commit delinquencies, 
i.e. boundedly rational second movers play Betray with a certain probability 
and do not have a clear underlying strategy. 
IV. This probability to play Betray is independent of stakes5 and the specific 
round a player is in. It is considered as completely exogenous. 
V. All assumptions on rationality and bounded rationality as well as the 
specific probability to play Betray are common knowledge. 
VI. The underlying game is a population game with role asymmetry, i.e. a 
share of the entire population is considered to be first and the rest is 
considered to be second movers. Furthermore the population is big enough 
for interaction between randomly matched players to be anonymous (and 
facing the same opponent twice is unlikely).  
VII. The cooperative Nash-Equilibrium exists in the completely rational case, 
i.e. the specific payoff structure makes cooperation in principle feasible. 
Notation: 
k…history length, where              
k*…cutoff value for the history length (decisive for the Nash-Equilibrium realization) 
s…fraction of rational and self interested SMs, where         
x…probability to commit a delinquency, where         
 
                
 
    …sum over five rounds of the probability to be Blue for SMs 
where:         and 1 is being Blue and 0 is being Yellow and              is not 
treated as a probability anymore, where    
 
          
Blue…indicating a good reputation 
Yellow… indicating a bad reputation 
                                            
5
If the probability of mistakes was not exogenous, the calculations would become significantly more 
complex and need quantal response equilibrium (QRE) considerations along the lines of McKelvey 
and Palfrey (1998).    
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Payoffs: 
– five round payoffs: 
  
            … sum of FM and SM average payoffs over 5 rounds if SM is 
rational and self-interested at history length k 
  
           … sum of FM and SM average payoffs over 5 rounds if SM is 
boundedly rational at history length k 
  
          … weighted average of   
         
and   
        
at history length k 
 
– single payoffs also indicated as   
 ,   
  respectively 
 a…FM (Out/…) b…FM (Trust/Betray) c…FM (Trust/Honor) 
 d…SM (Out/…) e…SM (Trust/Betray) f…SM (Trust/Honor) 
 
where: 
                                                               
                                                               
                                                                        
 
6.1.1. Falling payoff function 
Proposition 1: 
The social payoff function is decreasing in k if the critical value of k* was surpassed. 
 
Proof: 
I prove this by showing that increasing history length from any level k’>k* to a new 
level k’+1>k* under specific conditions leads to a decrease in social payoffs. The 
payoff function is of the following structure: 
                                                          
    ( + )  
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This payoff function is decoupled from the exact number of players6 as it represents 
the payoff of an average first and an average second mover who play for five rounds.  
I rewrite the social payoff function as a weighted average of 
 
             and            : 
 
                                               
 
                             . 
                                                   
I start at a point in which cooperation equilibriums can be realized (see assumption 7) 
and the specific history length is k’. Increasing the history length by one round to k’+1 
does not change             . This is the case because rational and self-interested 
first and second movers already play best response as history length is increased 
from a k’ already sustaining cooperation even though the part of the social payoff 
function that is indicated by  
            is changing. The only factor that changes is 
the probability of being Blue for boundedly rational second movers. 
The              is decreasing in k (see Appendix B).  
 
             changes by      →                 changes by   , where      
(note that      only holds if the              was already at its upper boundary of 
5) therefore  
            is changing if     : 
 
rewriting  
            in terms of changes:  
 
            
                                                            
 
            
 
 
             
 
This means that if u is bigger than v than  
            is decreasing if      
                                            
6
 The number of players needs to be sufficiently large to guarantee anonymity through the random 
matching. 
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    if                         
 
Due to the assumptions on the payoffs this is true. The non-cooperative single round 
outcome (a+d) is socially the least best and the weighted average of two better 
outcomes. Therefore the left side is always bigger than the right side (recall:     
 >  +  > +  ). 
 
      
           
       . 
 
  
        
stays constant if history length increased.  
 
Therefore Proposition 1 is correct: 
                                                                   
                                                              
 
6.1.2. Result 
For the specific payoff structure implemented on this game the social payoff function 
is in fact decreasing in history length, if the presumed equilibrium with k* existed. For 
all payoffs that make the punishment solution feasible, and that follow the structure 
presumed in this game, the social payoff function is falling in k if the k was bigger or 
equal to k*. It is important to now focus on the existence of stable cooperation in the 
bounded rationality case.   
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6.2. Equilibrium considerations in the bounded rationality case  
For the results of the payoff function to be conclusive, I have to show that there exists 
a state of stable cooperation if a share of second movers is boundedly rational. In 
Model 2, assumption 7, I claimed that punishment through the trigger strategy is 
feasible, and presumed that there is still a cut off value for the history length which 
marks the point at which the Nash-Equilibrium outcomes switch. This level I denoted 
as k*. In the following part I consider two options that lead to beneficial and stable 
cooperation sustained through an equilibrium concept. 
First, I show that the Nash-Equilibrium developed in Model 1 is to some extent robust 
against bounded rationality of second movers. The Nash-Equilibrium prediction is still 
licit if bounded rationality second movers play Betray with a high probability but their 
number is small, i.e. x needs to be large and s needs to be small.  
Second, I show that there are coordination equilibriums which could sustain 
cooperation if the cooperative Nash-Equilibrium described became impossible to 
reach, i.e. there are incentives (for first movers) to play S1(1,0) if x is relatively small. 
These coordination equilibriums are based on the assumption that first movers can 
coordinate themselves to play the trigger strategy, even though they have an 
incentive to deviate from the trigger strategy. 
 
6.2.1. Robustness of the cooperative Nash-Equilibrium 
In this extension to Model 2, I derive conditions on s, the size of the fraction of 
boundedly rational second movers, and x, the exogenous probability to play Betray.  
               
   
   
      
                      
         
           
 
These conditions secure the Nash-Equilibriums described in Model 1 for the set of 
Assumptions of Model 2. Particularly, I derive conditions guaranteeing that S1(1,0) 
can still be first movers’ best response by inducing the rational second movers to play 
the Honor strategy. There are two possible deviation strategies for first movers. First, 
there is the Out-option(S1(0,0)). Second, there is the always Trust strategy (S1(1,1)). I 
therefore split the analysis into two separate cases, guaranteeing that S1(1,0) is still 
the best response respective to the deviation strategies. The intersection of the two 
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set of solutions (S1(1,1) and S1(0,0) as deviation strategies) gives the set of solutions 
for which S1(1,0) stays best response. 
 
a) check whether S1(0,0) becomes BR 
                   
       
                    
           
                   
    
 
                                     
          
 
Where,         
                              is the expected payoff for a 
first mover from playing a boundedly rational second mover. 
Case 1:  
Equation 1 is true if both factors on the left side were bigger than the factor on 
the right side.  
                          needs to hold. 
From the calculations in Model 1 I recall that              is a necessary 
condition for the Nash-Equilibrium to be feasible and can be considered to be 
true (otherwise cooperation was in general not feasible).  
          is the case if             → hence   
   
   
 
→ hence                               
         is fulfilled if: 
  
   
   
 and      
           . 
 
Case 2:  
The case where 
   
   
     and             . From above I know that in 
this case          .  
→ Hence, there needs to be a condition on s(k,x) that makes sure that 
depending on   
  and the history length fulfills Equation 1:  
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Combining cases 1 and 2 leads to the result that S1(1,0) is better than S1(0,0) if the 
following condition was fulfilled:  
 
  
    
   
   
             
  
   
   
              
        
          
             
   
 
For the payoffs used in the experiment the problem reduces to               
         
          and S1(1,0) is better than S1(0,0) if the following condition was 
fulfilled:   
 
  
        
  
                 
         
         
   
 
b) check whether S1(1,1) becomes BR 
S1(1,1) becomes BR for the first movers if the expected payoff that a first mover 
received from a boundedly rational second mover is better than the payoff they 
receive from playing Out. 
As                   
   
   
 , the probability x to play Betray has to be 
 
   
   
     for S1(1,0) to be better than S1(1,1).  
 
Using the payoffs from the experiment, this translates in the following condition for 
S1(1,1) becomes BR: 
                                  
 
6.2.2. Nash-Equilibrium 
Combining a) and b) the cooperative Nash-Equilibrium still exists if and only if: 
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Using the payoffs from the experiment, the cooperative Nash-Equilibrium can be 
sustained if and only if: 
                         
                      
                             
                             
 
 
                    
   
                                         
                             
                             
                     
                                                                     
  
 
6.2.3. Coordination Equilibriums  
Here I look at the case where first movers have incentives to play S1(1,1) which 
eventually drives rational and self-interested second movers to play Betray in each 
round. By this presumption on coordination, second movers’ probability to play Betray 
has to be:      
   
   
. This in return induces rational and self-interested (by 
Assumption I all first movers) to play S1(0,0) and cooperation breaks down.  
The coordination Equilibrium I introduce here, under strong assumptions on the 
ability of first movers to coordinate themselves, has the power to sustain stable 
cooperation. The intuition is that, knowing of the dynamic that evolves, the population 
of first movers could agree to play a combination of S1(1,0) and S1(1,1). First movers 
could agree on a fraction that plays S1(1,1) and a fraction that plays S1(1,0). 
Depending on the history length first movers have to choose a level of deviation 
towards S1(1,1) that still induces rational and self-interested second movers to play 
cooperatively. This approach needs coordination as the fraction playing S1(1,1) is 
better off than the fraction playing S1(1,0). This persists as long as a sufficient 
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amount of first movers continues to play S1(1,0) but every first mover has incentives 
to deviate to S1(1,1).  
Nevertheless, I suppose in this context that such a form of coordination is possible 
and derive the cut-off values for the fraction sizes that define the coordination 
Equilibriums possible. There is, in fact, experimental evidence supporting this 
assumption. Punishment, even though costly and irrational takes place if there are 
also social incentives involved (Milinski and Rockenbach 2006 Fehr, Fischbacher and 
Gächter 2002). Costly punishment solutions are frequently chosen in the public good 
game (see, e.g., Fehr and Gächter 2002). This could also be the case in this game, 
especially if being rational might not be that rational after all, as rationality leads to 
the non cooperative, hence, the least best outcome. It is important to note that the 
payoffs have to enable punishment solution, i.e. there needs to be a k* for which the 
cost of punishment exceed the costs of avoiding punishment for second movers 
(Assumption VII). 
I compare relevant second movers’ strategies to the cooperative Nash-Equilibrium 
strategy to determine at which level of first mover deviation (towards S1(1,1)) the 
second movers’ best response switches. In particular, I show at which level of 
deviation second movers switch from Honor to the next best strategy depending on 
the history length k. 
 
Notation: 
t…share of FM playing S1(1,1) instead of S1(1,0) 
(1-t)…share of FM playing S1(1,0) 
t*(S1,S2,…)…cut-off level 
 
Given the FMs’ strategies, there are two relevant deviation strategies for SMs to be 
considered: 
S2(Betray)…  play Betray whenever they are trusted  
S2(Betray’invest)… play Betray whenever they are trusted but always invest in a 
good reputation for the last round (play honor to guarantee being 
blue in the last round)  
(it is important to note that S2(Invest) is in the case where first movers are completely  
rational and self-interested and playing S1(1,0) equivalent to S2(Betray) therefore 
there are only two realistic strategies to consider) 
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S2(Invest)… play Betray whenever they are trusted and immediately 
afterwards invest in a good reputation again 
 
Deviation Strategies  
 
For k≥4 Betray is the relevant SM strategy (incentives to play Betray increase with t) 
while Betray’invest due to the specific k is equal to the Honor strategy 
Find t for which                      
                    
   
   
   
 
 
For k=3 and depending on the specific parameters in the game (single round payoffs) 
one of the two strategies is the “closest” to Honor:  
 
                            
       
  
                                     
        
                            
        
   
or 
                               
 
Find t for which                       
                                            
            
       
   
 
Find t for which                                
                     
   
       
      
 
 
For k=2 and depending on the specific parameters in the game (single round payoffs) 
one of the two strategies is the “closest” to Honor:  
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or 
                               
 
Find t for which                              
                                                      
                  
            
       
     
 
 
Find t for which                       
                                                    
                        
 
6.2.4. Coordination Equilibrium is characterized as following: 
A fraction t of first movers plays   (1,1) and the fraction (1-t) plays   (1,0). Second 
movers play the Honor strategy if they are rational and self-interested (a fraction s of 
all second movers). They play Betray with probability x and Honor with probability (1-
x) if they are boundedly rational (a fraction (1-s) of all second movers). The exact 
number of such feasible coordination equilibriums is not particularly important but in 
principle every t ≤ t* describes a possible coordination equilibrium. The t* describes 
the smallest t that makes a deviation strategy for second movers better than the 
Honor strategy given the history length. 
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7. Discussion 
What was the objective? 
My primary objective in this thesis was to analyze the effects of reputation formation, 
i.e. public information on delinquencies, on cooperation and social wealth in a 
sequential two-player trust game. I specifically focused on two questions. First, is 
reputation formation a valid institution to ensure cooperation? Second, are 
aggregated players’ payoffs affected by excessive public information in a bounded 
rationality case, i.e. should public information be limited? 
 
Results 
In Model 1 I showed that there exists cooperation as a Nash-Equilibrium if the history 
length was long enough and all players were assumed to be rational and self-
interested. Social payoffs in this cooperative Nash-Equilibrium are higher than in the 
non cooperative Nash-Equilibrium that is played if the history length was not long 
enough. Therefore, the reputation mechanism in the completely rational case is a 
valid institution to sustain cooperation.  
In Model 2 I showed that there are two possible ways in which limiting public 
information on delinquencies, i.e. restricting history length, leads to a stable and 
socially better outcome than unrestricted information. First, a cooperative “Nash-
Equilibrium” exists, even though a share of second movers is boundedly rational. And 
while second movers’ and overall wealth increases, first movers’ wealth on average 
decreases compared to the unrestricted case. For this Nash-Equilibrium first movers 
have to have incentives to play Out facing a boundedly rational second mover. 
Second, if first movers were assumed to be able to find a coordination equilibrium 
agreement, there exist several coordination equilibriums in which a fraction of first 
movers still plays the trigger (S1(1,0)) and the rest a forgiving strategy (S1(1,1)). 
Given that one of these coordination equilibriums is played, first and second movers’ 
wealth increases compared to the unrestricted case.  
Therefore, I conclude that players’ payoffs are affected by excessive public 
information in a bounded rationality case, i.e. public information should be restricted if 
one of the above mentioned cases occurs. 
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7.1. Critiques that might limit the generalizability of my results 
The models I use in this thesis are based on a sequential trust game that stylizes 
interactions between two parties where, due to anonymity, cooperation problems 
arise. Here, and throughout the thesis, I presumed that cooperation is beneficial for 
society and the parties involved. In the following I describe potential problems and 
critiques that might arise if a general concept on the ability and the setup of 
reputation formation was derived from the game’s particulars. 
 
First, the reputation mechanism is of the simplest form. It creates a black and white 
world in which reputation can be either good or bad. The information available only 
indicates that a bad reputation player committed at least one delinquency in one of 
the previous k periods. The reputation mechanism therefore omits a great deal of 
information, such as the time of occurrence of the delinquency, how often a player 
committed delinquencies, and all actions that happened before the previous k 
periods. 
However, I show that even this simple form of reputation is sufficient to give first 
movers the tool to induce second movers by punishment in a binary choice setup if 
reputation was implemented accurately. Whether more detailed reputation 
information would be more efficient needs further consideration. Especially, if the 
situation was not limited to a binary choice problem but had a more diversified choice 
set. In such a case first movers could condition the terms of their engagement not 
only on the reputation information, but also on the time the delinquency was 
committed and its frequency. This could lead to inefficiencies. First movers could 
overcharge (if granting loans) or squeeze prices under their actual value (in an online 
market) depending on the situation, instead of granting second chances. This again 
might lead to inefficiencies and might make the restriction of information (forgetting) 
even more beneficial following the same argumentation used in this thesis. 
 
Second, the commitment condition on first movers’ strategies which was revealed as 
essential for rational cooperation to occur, is critical. If it was self-induced by players 
there is a credibility issue as it prevents them from playing best response in each 
period.  
If the game was not finite or had no pre-specified end (the exact time of end was 
unknown) which in the real world is likely to be the case, this commitment condition is 
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not necessary to sustain cooperation. The end game effect is cancelled out and 
therefore cooperation would be even easier to achieve. Furthermore, the condition 
could be seen as a company policy ensured by a contractual agreement and 
therefore not completely random.  
 
Third, the assumption that deviation from best response and the actual deviation 
behavior in the bounded rational case are common knowledge is highly unlikely.  
I use it to be able to show the dynamics of the game if the assumption held. 
Nevertheless, I draw conclusions from this as it indicates what happens if collective 
beliefs were of a certain structure. 
 
Fourth, to assume that bounded rationality is modeled as trembles is critical but there 
is literature supporting my choice to model delinquencies that way (Selten 1975; 
Stahl 1990). 
If enough of the first movers play the cooperation inducing strategy (S1(1,0)), it is 
clearly a mistake for second movers to play Betray, as they ultimately will be worse 
off if the history length is longer than k*. Therefore I assume that not all second 
movers have the ability to fully understand the game and play best response in every 
period. This has been an easy way of modeling bounded rationality. Different ways of 
modeling bounded rationality could be interesting for further research and lead to 
significantly different results.   
 
Fifth, the assumption that first movers have the chance to coordinate themselves into 
a, for them favorable, coordination equilibrium if they had incentives to be forgiving, 
i.e. to play Trust unconditionally, can be backed by behavioral economics. 
Coordination of such a kind requires that, depending on the likeliness of delinquency, 
a share of first movers plays the trigger strategy knowing this is not best response. 
This is without doubt hard to achieve because a free riding problem occurs. Every 
first mover has an incentive to act forgiving no matter what the agreement was if the 
likeliness of delinquencies was low and first movers got on average more from 
forgiving than from carrying out the punishment. Still, even if it is unlikely, such 
coordination could be a matter of a contract between first movers and therefore 
feasible. Furthermore, evidence suggests that strong reciprocity (voluntarily 
cooperate if treated fairly but punish non-cooperators) exists even if it was costly 
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(Fehr and Gächter 2002; Fehr, Fischbacher and Gächter 2002; Milinski and 
Rockenbach 2006). This could be a possible behavioral economics explanation for 
coordination to exist, as some first movers might choose to play the trigger strategy 
even though it is costly. 
 
Sixth, the payoff structure that I impose on the game ranks social payoffs in the stage 
game as following: 
                                                                 
This might lead to the critique that reducing history length was only beneficial 
because of the fact that from a social perspective the Out-Option (NT,...) is the least 
best. Therefore even if all second movers played Betray in each round that they got 
to play earlier due to a restriction on information, social payoffs improve. The critique 
could be that my results only work because of that specific structure.  
I can show that this is not the case. Changing the structure accordingly, I can 
reproduce my results.  
                                                                
The conditions on the parameters of the game for which a restriction of public 
information is beneficial change, but the general conclusion stays the same:  
 
               
       
       
   
   
   
 
                       
         
           
 
 
            
    
                   
  
                         
       
       
   
   
   
           
         
           
                     
                                                                     
  
 
The payoff function is falling in history length and the k* is still socially favorable in 
the respective area. For a detailed analysis see Appendix A. 
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7.2. Concluding Remarks 
Based on my results and also incorporating potential drawbacks of the models I 
would conclude that public information in the form of reputation has positive effects 
on real world societies. If information about delinquencies was available long enough 
to punish the delinquents in a way that their costs from punishment (exclusion) are 
higher than the gain from betraying, cooperation is beneficial for both parties and the 
society. In particular, if there was no information available there is space for the 
market to set up such an institution “privately”. Assuming that an institution providing 
public information is costly there are different possibilities to finance it. I consider that 
confiders, the agents who base their trust on information about their counterparts, as 
the most likely case financiers of such an institution. The aggregate of all confiders 
has all the information necessary to create complete profiles about their counterparts 
past behavior. Therefore they could set up an institution that collects all information 
and then distributes the right profile to the right confider. An institution financed by 
possible delinquents is hardly plausible as after committing a delinquency there exist 
strong incentives not to report this truthfully. Thus such an institution would have a 
credibility problem. 
Taking this into consideration the confiders could influence or decide on the amount 
of information available. Considering my results from Model 2, this is not necessarily 
the optimal amount of information from a social perspective. Depending on the 
expected likeliness of delinquencies, confiders would either decide for the longest 
possible history length (marking delinquents for the rest of their lives) or the shortest 
possible history length that is still inducing cooperative behavior. This is the case if 
the information was coded binary (as in the reputation mechanism used in the game) 
and no further information was available. With a binary coded reputation confiders 
cannot distinguish between the history length (how long a delinquent holds the bad 
reputation) and the punishment. If the information was more detailed and the entire 
history of an opponent was known, confiders would always want the entire 
information available. Confiders could decouple punishment from reputation and 
decide independently for how long delinquents should be excluded from playing after 
having committed a delinquency. These punishments match the specific history 
lengths chosen in the binary reputation case. 
Nevertheless in both cases confiders punish delinquents too hard (choose a history 
length that is too long) from a social perspective if the expected payoffs confiders 
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receive from trusting are less than from excluding a boundedly rational opponent. 
Here, limitation of information would have positive effects on the society. Specifically, 
such a policy would increase delinquents’ wealth at costs of confiders. This, even 
though not pareto better, is socially optimal as the gains of delinquents would be 
higher than the losses of confiders.  
But such a policy is clearly distortive. Confiders who already carry the costs of the 
institution providing information are forced to forego payoffs on behalf of delinquents. 
Therefore, if implementing such a policy on the backs of confiders, it has to be 
secured in such a way that confiders are still better off than they would be in the non-
cooperative case. Otherwise there are clearly incentives to change their strategy to 
S1(0,0). Confiders would never engage in interaction and cooperation would break 
down. Thus I conclude that the creation of an institution that is collecting and 
reallocating information, in the manner of the reputation mechanism discussed, has 
the potential to increase social payoffs. There is space for "private" financing of this 
institution through confiders. Whether such an institution provides the optimal amount 
of information (a delinquent is marked long enough or too long) depends on the 
likeliness of delinquencies. If few delinquencies were committed, the market gives the 
right incentives and confiders choose the optimal amount of information. If the 
likeliness of delinquencies is above a certain level, confiders have personal 
incentives to "sort out” delinquents (mark and punish them forever after they have 
committed a delinquency). This is not optimal from a social perspective and would 
ask for government intervention. Limiting public information increases social payoffs 
but needs to be assessed carefully as otherwise the confiders would be driven out of 
cooperative equilibriums. 
Thus I give an argument for the common saying: Everybody deserves a second 
chance. 
  
42 
 
8. Appendix A: Change in payoff structure  
Reproduction of the findings on the Nash-Equilibrium prediction and the falling payoff 
function for a changed payoff structure.  
The payoff structure I imposed on the game and used throughout this paper ranks 
social payoffs in the stage game as following: 
 
                                                                 
 
In the following section I reproduce these findings with a payoff structure where 
(Trust/Betray) and the (Out/…) payoffs switch according to the social payoff rank:  
 
                                                                  
 
and the rest of the payoff structure stays the same: 
 
                                                              
                                                              
 
Even if the specific conditions change, all general results can be reproduced and the 
general conclusion stays the same.   
 
Proposition: 
The payoff function is falling in history length even if the payoff structure is changed 
in the above discussed manner. 
 
Proof: 
I use the same approach as in section 5.1.1. 
 
The payoff function is of the following structure: 
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This payoff function is decoupled from the exact number of players7 as it represents 
the payoff of an average first and an average second mover who play for five rounds.  
I rewrite the social payoff function as a weighted average of  
 
             and            : 
 
                                               
 
                            . 
                                                  
I start at a point in which cooperation equilibriums can be realized (see assumption 7) 
and the specific history length is k’. Increasing the history length by one round to k’+1 
does not change  
            . This is the case because rational and self-interested 
first and second mover already play best response as history length is increased from 
a k’ already sustaining cooperation. Though the part of the social payoff function that 
is indicated by  
            is changing. The only factor that changes is the 
probability of being Blue for boundedly rational second movers. The              is 
decreasing in k (see Appendix B).  
 
             changes by      →                 changes by   , where      
(note that      only holds if the              was already at its upper boundary of 
5) therefore  
            is changing if     : 
 
rewriting  
            in terms of changes:  
 
            
                                                            
 
            
 
 
             
 
This means that if u is bigger than v than  
            is decreasing if      
                                            
7
 The number of players needs to be sufficiently large to guarantee anonymity through the random 
matching. 
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    if                         
 
This is the case if:   
           
           
  
 
                             . 
 
 
            stays constant if history length increased.  
 
Therefore: 
                                                     
 
                                              
      
       
       
 
   
 
Nash Equilibrium (in the bounded rationality case with the changed payoff structure) 
The calculations are equivalent to the ones from section 5.2.2. but combined with the 
new condition for the falling payoff structure, the new Nash-Equilibrium is as 
following: 
The cooperative Nash-Equilibrium exists if and only if: 
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9. Appendix B: Proof of a decreasing likeliness to be Blue 
Proposition:  
The              is decreasing in k.  
 
Proof: 
The reasoning behind this decrease of a boundedly rational second movers’ 
likeliness to be Blue, if the history length increased, is simple. Given a specific set of 
strategies for first and second movers and a specific likeliness to play Betray for 
boundedly rational second movers, a ceteris paribus change in history length 
changes the             in the following way: 
Increasing k means that if committing a delinquency, second movers hold a bad 
reputation for a longer time, while nothing else changes therefore              
decreases as it represents the amount of rounds an average second mover holds a 
good reputation throughout the five round game  . 
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10. Appendix C: Abstract in English and German 
Abstract in English 
In this thesis I analyze the effects of public information on cooperation and efficiency 
in a game theory setting. My model is based on a sequential and repeated trust 
game with reputation formation. I determine cooperative Nash-Equilibriums for the 
standard theory case and analyze the effects on cooperation and the possible 
payoffs if standard theory assumptions were relaxed, i.e. in a bounded rationality 
case. I show that reputation formation in this trust game is, from a standard theory 
point of view, sufficient to sustain cooperation and that limiting the reputation 
information is beneficial for society in the bounded rationality case. 
 
Abstract in German 
In dieser Arbeit analysiere ich die Effekte von „Public Information“ auf 
Kooperationsverhalten in einem spieltheoretischen Kontext. Mein Modell basiert auf 
einem wiederholten Vertrauensspiel mit Reputations-Mechanismus.  In diesem 
Kontext zeige ich, dass Reputation, unter Standardannahmen, ausreichend ist, um 
Kooperation zu garantieren und eine Limitierung der (Reputations-) Information 
positive Effekte auf die Gesellschaft haben kann.      
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